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The Path of American Religious Liberty:
From the Original Theology to Formal
Neutrality and an Uncertain Futuret
DANIEL 0. CONKLE*
"'Tell us, then, what you think,"' the Pharisees said to Jesus, "'Is it lawful to pay
taxes to Caesar, or not?"".. "'Show me the money for the tax,"' Jesus responded.2
And they brought him a coin. And Jesus said to them, "Whose likeness and
inscription is this?" They said, "Caesar's." Then he said to them, "Render
therefore to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God the things that are
God's." When they heard it, they marveled; and they left him and went away.'
Even now, some two thousand years later, we may marvel at the simplicity and
profundity of Jesus's response to the Pharisees. Standing at the dawn of a third
millennium, we also may marvel at the continuing relevance and importance of the
basic question that Jesus was addressing. Even today, the question remains: what is
the proper relationship between religion and government? But Jesus's
answer-render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God the things that
are God's-leaves a number of questions open. What things are Caesar's? What
things are God's? What things are matters for civil government, and what things are
matters of religious obligation or choice? How should religious citizens relate to and
interact with civil government, and how should civil government relate to and
interact with them? Where does religious liberty begin and where does it end?
Through the ages, and still today, various religions and various governments have
embraced divergent responses to these questions.
In the United States, the basic principle of religious liberty emerged in the
founding period, and, in one form or another, it has prevailed ever since. Symbolized
by the First Amendment,' this legal principle protects the free exercise of religion
and, through disestablishment, it also precludes more indirect encroachments on
t Copyright 2000 by Daniel 0. Conkle.
* Robert L McKinney Professor of Law, Nelson Poynter Senior Scholar, and Adjunct
Professor of Religious Studies, Indiana University-Bloomington.
This Article is based upon a paper that I presented on April 9, 1999, at a Symposium
entitledReligiousLibertyat the Dawn of a New Millennium. This Symposium was sponsored
by the Law and Society Program of the School of Law at Indiana University-Bloomington
and by the Religious Liberty Project of Indiana University's Poynter Center for the Study of
Ethics and American Institutions. I am grateful to Dean Alfred C. Aman, Jr., of the School of
Law and to David H. Smith, the Director of the Poynter Center, without whose support this
Symposium would not have been possible. I also wish to thank all of the authors who have
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The articles in this Symposium appear in the order in which they originally were presented
orally.
1. Matthew 22:17 (Revised Standard Version).
2. Id. 22:19.
3. Id. 22:19-22.
4. The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof" U.S. CoNST. amend. I.
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religious liberty. The principle of religious liberty, however, has been and remains
a contested concept. Its meaning has evolved over time, and there is no reason to
believe that this evolution will not continue.
In this Article, I will sketch the history of religious liberty in the United States and
speculate on its future. As I will explain, the American understanding of religious
liberty once assumed that religion is both distinct and distinctly important.' It also
assumed the primacy of Christianity over other religions. Today, the second
assumption, the primacy of Christianity, has given way to a strong requirement of
equal treatment between and among religions, a requirement that I will call the
requirement of denominational equality.' The first assumption, that religion is
distinct and distinctly important, has not yet been abandoned, but it has been placed
in serious question. Thus, just as the law no longer gives preferential or special
treatment to Christianity, many would argue that it should no longer give
preferential or special treatment to obligations or choices that are religious as
opposed to nonreligious. More generally, many would argue that just like
Christianity and other religions, religion and nonreligion should be treated equally
under the law-that religion should receive neither preference nor disadvantage. As
we will see, the principle of equal treatment for religion and nonreligion-more
specifically, equal treatment in the sense of "formal neutrality," to use the
terminology of Professor Douglas Laycock--has played an increasingly prominent
role under both the Free Exercise and the Establishment Clauses.9
Looking toward the future, moreover, various philosophical, religious, and
jurisprudential forces would appear to support the continued and perhaps increasing
importance of formal neutrality as a governing principle of religious liberty in the
United States.'0 This notion of formal neutrality-equal, not special, treatment for
religion-tends to belie the claim that religion is distinct and distinctly important.
As aresult, ithas significant, and potentiallytroublesome, implications forthefuture
of religious liberty.
5. See infra Part I.
6. See infra Part II.A.
7. In the current Symposium, Professor William P. Marshall advances an argument that
points generally inthis direction. See William P. Marshall, What is the Matterwith Equality?:
An Assessment of the Equal Treatment of Religion and Nonreligion in First Amendment
Jurisprudence, 75 IND. L.J. 193 (2000).
8. Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward
Religion, 39 DEPAULL. REV. 993, 999-1001 (1990).
9. See infra Part ll.B.
10. See infra Part III.
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I. THE ORIGINAL THEOLOGY OF AMERICAN RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
A. Religion as Distinct and Distinctly Important
Various policies supported the adoption of the First Amendment's religion
clauses." One important policy, that of federalism, was not directly related to the
substance of religious liberty. Instead, this policy suggested simply that issues of
religious liberty should be beyond the control of the newly formed national
government-that they should continue to be resolved by the states.'2 But to one
degree or another, the various states themselves embraced religious liberty as a
substantive principle, and there is evidence that the framers and ratifiers of the First
Amendment likewise supported the substantive idea of religious liberty. 3
Whether or not embodied in the First Amendment as originally understood, the
substantive idea of religious liberty was firmly rooted in the founding period, and it
was firmly rooted not in secular philosophy, but rather in theology. Thus, for the
Founders, the central justification for religious liberty was distinctly religious. As
Professor Steven D. Smith has explained, this justification was based on the
combination of two theological principles: first, that religious duties are more
important than secular duties, and second, that individuals must undertake their
religious duties voluntarily, not under legal compulsion. 4 During the founding
period, this religious justification for religious liberty-a justification that assumes
that religion is both distinct and distinctly important-was prominent in the
arguments "not only of ministers and religious leaders, but also of political leaders
such as Madison and Jefferson." 5 In particular, Madison relied on this justification
in his Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments.'6 And Jefferson
advanced this argument in support of his celebrated Virginia Act for Religious
11. See William Van Alstyne, Trends in the Supreme Court: Mr. Jefferson's Crumbling
Wall-A Comment on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 DuKEL.J. 770,772-80 (suggesting thatthese
policies included federalism, religious voluntarism, and separatism).
12. 1 have argued elsewhere that the Establishment Clause, as originally understood, did
not reflect a generally applicable principle of religious liberty, but instead was animated by
the policy of federalism. See Daniel 0. Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the
Establishment Clause, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 1113, 1132-35 (1988); see also, e.g., AKHL REED
AMAR, ThE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 32-42 (1998); Akhil Reed
Amar, Some Notes on the Establishment Clause, 2 ROGER WLLIAMS U. L. REv. 1 (1996).
Other scholars have extended this argument to the religion clauses generally. See, e.g.,
STEVEN D. SMrI, FOREORDAINED FAEURE: TBE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE
OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 17-43 (1995); Kurt T. Lash, Power and the Subject of Religion, 59
OIHo ST. L.J. 1069, 1088-1143 (1998).
13. See, e.g., Van Alstyne, supra note 11, at 772-80; cf. Douglas Laycock,
"Nonpreferential" Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 875, 908 (1986) (arguing that "when the Framers debated the details of the religion
clauses, their views on religious liberty were more salient than their views on federalism").
14. See Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional
Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 154-66 (1991).
15. Id. at 162; see id. at 153-66. See generally Symposium, Religious Dimensions of
American Constitutionalism, 39 EMORY L.J. 1 (1990).
16. For a discussion of Madison's arguments, see Smith, supra note 14, at 161.
2000]
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Freedom. Thus, in its preamble, the Virginia Act declares that "Almighty God hath
created the mind free" and that compelled religion is "a departure from the plan of
the Holy Author of our religion, who, being Lord both of body and mind, yet chose
not to propagate it by coercions on either, as was in his Almighty power to do."'"
B. The Primacy of Christianity'"
In important respects, the history of the Western world is the history of
Christianity. (We are reaching the third millennium, it bears noting, only because
our Western calendar dates from the time of Christ.) The history of America is no
exception. Thus, from the colonial period forward, Christianity has played a
prominent and leading role, both socially and politically. Indeed, throughout most
of our country's history, there has been an overt Christian, and primarily Protestant,
dominance in American law and public life. Until relatively recent times, this
Christian dominance has informed and refined the American understanding of
religious liberty.
The Founders' religious justification for religious liberty, complete with its
emphasis on religious voluntarism, was groundedin (Protestant) Christianthought. 19
More generally, Christian values and insights were intrinsically connected to the
political culture of the new nation. As Professors Richard Vetterli and Gary C.
Bryner have explained:
The general Judeo-Christian tradition permeated American life. There were
strong sentiments of mission, a belief that this pristine land had been set apart
and preserved for a chosen people, and faith that America "was not only a
destined nation, but a redeeming nation." There was a general consensus that
Christian values provided the basis for civil society. Religious leaders had
contributed to the political discourse of the Revolution, and the Bible was the
most widely read and cited text. Religion, the Founders believed, fostered
republicanism and was therefore central to the life of the new nation."
Christianity thus supported the public life of the newly formed nation. In return, it
was entitled to political and legal support as the favored, ifnot established, American
17. Virginia Act for Religious Freedom, VA. CODE ANN. § 57-1 (Michie 1995) (enacted
Jan. 16, 1786); see Smith, supra note 14, at 162.
18. Portions of Parts I.B and IIA are derived from Daniel 0. Conkle, Different Religions,
Different Politics: Evaluating the Role of Competing Religious Traditions in American
Politics and Law, 10 J.L. & REUGION 1, 4-9 (1993-94).
19. As Professor Smith writes in the current Symposium, Madison's influentialMemorial
and Remonstrance was informed by beliefs that were "not merely theistic but Christian, and
not merely Christian but Protestant, and not merely Protestant but reflective of a sort of non-
statist voluntaristic Protestantism." StevenD. Smith, Blooming Confusion:Madison 'sMixed
Legacy, 75 IND. L.J. 61, 66 (2000).
20. Richard Vetterli & Gary C. Bryner, Religion, Public Virtue, and the Founding of the
American Republic, in TOWARDAMoRE PERFECT UNION: Sx EssAYs ONTHE CONSTTUTION
91, 92 (Neil L. York ed., 1988) (footnote omitted); see id. at 91-117; see also RIcHARD
VETrEI & GARY C. BRYNER, IN SEARCH OF THE REPUBLIC: PUBLIC VIRTuE AND THE ROOTS
OF AMERICAN GoVERNmNT (1987).
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religion. According to Justice Story, it was widely understood "that Christianity
ought to receive encouragement from the state so far as was not incompatible with
the private rights of conscience and the freedom ofreligious worship."" "An attempt
to level all religions," he added, "would have created universal disapprobation, ifnot
universal indignation."'
Justice Story was describing the founding period, but a similar understanding
prevailed throughout the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth. In 1892, for
example, based upon its survey of American law and culture, the Supreme Court
declared that "this is a Christian nation." And some forty years later, in 193 1, the
Court officially reaffirmed that "[w]e are a Christian people." 24 This sort of language
was soon to disappear from judicial opinions, but the legal favoritism of Christianity
continued for some time. In the public schools, for example, Christian prayers and
Bible readings remained common for another thirty years-until the Supreme Court
banned them in its 1962 and 1963 decisions.'
II. THE EROSION OF THE ORIGINAL THEOLOGY:
THE EMERGENCE AND GROWTH OF DENOMINATIONAL
EQUALTY AND FORMAL NEUTRALITY
Having sustained American religious liberty for most of the nation's history, the
original theology began to erode in the latter half of the twentieth century. First, the
legal and public culture adopted a strong requirement of denominational equality,
thereby rejecting the notion of Christian dominance. Second, and more recently, the
law has increasingly embraced the concept of formal neutrality between religion and
nonreligion, a concept that tends to undermine the original theology's first and most
fundamental precept-that religion is both distinct and distinctly important.
21.2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIEs ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNrrED STATES
§ 1874, at 630-31 (Melville M. Bigelow ed., Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 5th ed. 1891).
22. Id. at 631; see also id. § 1871, at 628 ("[l~t is impossible for those who believe in the
truth of Christianity as a divine revelation to doubt that it is the especial duty of government
to foster and encourage it among all the citizens and subjects."). This is not to deny that the
rhetoric of equality also was present in the founding period. See Timothy L. Hall, Religion,
Equality, and Difference, 65 TEMP. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1992); Laura Underkuffler-Freund, The
Separation ofthe Religious and the Secular: A Foundational Challenge to First Amendment
Theory, 36 WM. & MARY L. RLzv. 837, 928-29, 947-49 (1995) [hereinafter Underkuffler-
Freund, Foundational Challenge]; see also Smith, supra note 19, at 62 ("Madison was ahead
of his time in emphasizing-again and again-that all religions should be treated equally.").
23. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457,471 (1892).
24. United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605,625 (1931); cf Harold J. Berman, Religion
and Law: The First Amendment in Historical Perspective, 35 EMORY L.J. 777, 779 (1986)
(suggesting that prior to World War I, the United States thought of itself "as a Protestant
Christian country").




A. Denominational Equality and Its Implications
The 1960s marked an important turn in the development of American religious
liberty. Although the Supreme Court had foreshadowed this shift in earlier
decisions,26 it was only in the 1960s that the American understanding of religious
liberty firmly rejected the idea of legally sanctioned Christian dominance and firmly
embraced a vigorous requirement of denominational equality. The Supreme Court's
school prayer decisions were momentous steps in this direction. Also important was
the Court's 1968 invalidation of a law that banned the teaching of human evolution
in the public schools-a law that had been grounded in (a prominent form of)
Christian thinking concerning the origins of the human race." Although the school
prayer and evolution decisions were (and remain) unpopular in many quarters, the
Court's underlying principle of denominational equality was championed in the
1960s not only by the Court, but also by Congress. Thus, in the Civil Rights Acts of
1964 and 1968, Congress broadly prohibited religious discrimination in various
arenas, including public accommodations, employment, and housing.2" Under the
Supreme Court's decisions, the law could no longer provide overt favoritism for
Christianity, and under the legislation enacted by Congress, even nongovernmental
favoritism was forbidden in the quasi-public arenas addressed by the Civil Rights
Acts. Clearly, the legal culture, and with it the public culture, was shifting decidedly
from Christian dominance to denominational equality..
Today, the requirement of denominational equality forms a critical part of our
understanding of religious liberty. Not only is this requirement embodied inthe Civil
Rights Acts, but it also lies at the core of the Supreme Court's First Amendment
doctrine. Thus, the Court has renounced the Christian dominance that prevailed " [a]t
one time,"29 and it has interpreted the religion clauses to reflect a strong
constitutional commitment to equal treatment for all religions, Christian and non-
Christian alike. According to current interpretations, the Establishment Clause
forbids the government to "prefer one religion over another."3 Even the Court's
critics have applauded this "no preference" requirement,3' which the Court has called
26. See, e.g., Everson v. Board ofEduc., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (declaring that government
cannot "prefer one religion over another").
27. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
28. See Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1994) (public
accommodations); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994)
(employment); Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1994).
29. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52-53 (1985).
30. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15. Based on this principle, the Court has ruled that
governmental action preferring certain religions over others should be subjected to strict
judicial scrutiny. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244-55 (1982).
31. See, e.g., Wallace, 472 U.S. at 113 (Relmquist, J., dissenting) (stating that the
government is precluded "from asserting a preference for one religious denomination or sect
over others"); ROBERTL. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICALFACT AND
CURRENT FIcTION (1982). See generally Rodney K. Smith, Nonpreferentialism in
Establishment Clause Analysis: A Response to ProfessorLaycock, 65 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 245
(1991) (discussing possible variants of"no preference" notion).
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"[t]he clearest command of the Establishment Clause."32 The requirement of
denominational equality also has played a powerful role in the Court's interpretation
of the Free Exercise Clause. When it extended free exercise protection to Saturday
Sabbatarians, for example, the Court emphasized that its ruling would put these
religious believers on a par with Sunday worshippers.33 The requirement of
denominational equality also helps explain the Court's controversial interpretation
of the Free Exercise Clause in Employment Division v. Smith,' which heralded a
broad retreat from the granting of religious exemptions from laws of general
application.35 Whatever the Court's other justifications, Smith rested in part on a
belief that the granting of such exemptions creates an undue risk of discrimination
between or among religions, a risk that cannot be reconciled with the paramount
requirement of denominational equality.'
32. Larson, 456 U.S. at 244. See generally John H. Garvey, Freedom and Equality in the
Religion Clauses, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 193 (finding an equality principle inherent in the
Establishment Clause); Ira C. Lupu, Keeping the Faith: Religion, Equality and Speech in the
U.S. Constitution, 18 CoNN. L. REV. 739, 741-55 (1986) (reading the Establishment Clause
to embody the principle of"equal religious liberty"); Michael A. Paulsen, Religion, Equality,
and the Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to Establishment Clause Adjudication,
61 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 311 (1986) (elaborating a similar argument).
33. See Sherbert v. Vemner, 374 U.S. 398,409 (1963) ("[T]he extension ofunemployment
benefits to Sabbatarians in common with Sunday worshippers reflects nothing more than the
governmental obligation of neutrality in the face of religious differences.").
34.494 U.S. 872 (1990).
35. Id. For criticisms of Smith, see, for example, Douglas Laycock, The Remnants ofFree
Exercise, 1990 SuP. CT. REV. 1; Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the
Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109 (1990); Stephen Pepper, Conflicting Paradigms of
Religious Freedom: Liberty Versus Equality, 1993 BYU L. REv. 7; Harry F. Tepker, Jr.,
Hallucinations ofNeutrality in the Oregon Peyote Case, 16 AM. INDiANL. REv. 1 (1991). For
scholarly commentary supporting the basic approach of Smith, ifnot the Court's rationale, see,
for example, William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith andFree Exercise Revisionism, 58 U.
Cm. L. REV. 308 (1991); Mark Tushnet, The Rhetoric ofFree Exercise Discourse, 1993 BYU
L. REv. 117.
36. Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Smith contained conflicting statements on this
point On the one hand, Scalia apologetically stated that by leaving religious freedom largely
to the political process, the Court's decision might actually engender a type of religious
discrimination by "plac[ing] at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not
widely engaged in." Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. At the same time, however, he suggested that
Free Exercise exemptions were "a constitutional anomaly," unlike the "constitutional norm"
of "equality of treatment," id. at 886, and that the Court would continue to "strictly scrutinize
governmental classifications based on religion," id. at 886 n.3.
Whatever the ambiguities in Scalia's rationale, his broad retreat from the granting of Free
Exercise exemptions was joined by Justice Stevens, who provided a critical fifth vote for the
majority opinion. In joining the Court's general renunciation of free exercise exemptions,
Justice Stevens clearly was influenced by the principle of denominational equality, on which
he consistently has relied in arguing against such exemptions. See, e.g., United States v. Lee,
455 U.S. 252, 263 n.2 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) ("[T]he principal
reason for adopting a strong presumption against [claims for religious exemptions] ... is the
overriding interest in keeping the government-whether it be the legislature or the
courts-out of the business of evaluating the relative merits of differing religious claims,"
2000]
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The requirement of denominational equality is designed to enhance the freedom
and dignity of all religious believers, and it has achieved a significant measure of
success toward this end. It has accorded legal respect to religious believers
and-although religious bigotry has not disappeared-it has helped encourage a
societal norm of religious toleration. As a result, the requirement of denominational
equality generally has supported and nurtured the diversity and vitality of the
American religious experience.' But we dare not miss the underlying predicate for
this requirement: that according to the law, the particular content of religion does
not matter. Any one religion, whatever its substance, is equal to any other. "[A]ny
form of religious discrimination," writes one scholar, "needs to be seen as
incompatible with religious liberty and shouldbeviewed as no less a violation ofthe
human person than discrimination that is based on race, national origin, or sex."'
Religious liberty now means that religious differences are matters of legal
indifference. Contrary to Justice Story's expectation, we have "level[ed] all
religions"39 as a matter of law, and this leveling-this belief that religious
differences do not matter-has increasingly saturated the public culture generally.
Among other consequences, this leveling has contributed to the view that religion
is nothing more than a matter oftaste-a matter ofprivate and individual taste-and
that it therefore should play little if any role in the political or public life of
contemporary America.40
B. Formal Neutrality and Its Implications
The requirement of denominational equality demands that all religions be treated
equally. The broader notion of religious neutrality includes the requirement of
denominational equality, but it also goes one step further, demanding that the
government neither favor nor disfavor religion in general, as compared to
nonreligion. In the same judicial decisions that signaled the end of Christian
which can create the appearance of "favoring one religion over another."); Goldman v.
Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 512 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (reiterating the discriminatory
potential of religious exemptions and noting "the interest in uniform treatment for the
members of all religious faiths").
Justice O'Connor provided a sixth vote for the Court's judgment in Smith, but she wrote
a separate opinion that rejected the majority's dramatic reconstruction of free exercise
doctrine. Smith, 494 U.S. at 891-907 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
37. The Supreme Court's decision in Smnith, grounded in part on the requirement of
denominational equality, suggests that this requirement may not always support religious
diversity and vitality.
38. James E. Wood, Jr., Religious Pluralism and Religious Freedom, 31 J. CHURCH &
STATE 7, 12 (1989). "This is not to ignore the profound differences in teachings and practices
that divide religions from one another," the author continues, "but these differences are no
basis for any form of legal discrimination between the various religions." Id. But cf.
McConnell, supra note 35, at 1139-41 (arguing that religious differences are important and
should be legally accommodated by treating religion more like handicap than like race).
39. See supra text accompanying note 22.
40. For an elaboration of this point, see Conkle, supra note 18, at 8-11. For additional
commentary in this Symposium on the role of religion in politics and public life, see Robert
Audi, Religious Values, Political Action, and Civic Discourse, 75 IND. L.J. 273 (2000).
[Vol. 75:1
THE PATH OFAMERICANRELIGIOUS LIBERTY
dominance in American law,4 the Supreme Court also embraced this broader
concept of religious neutrality. In its school prayer decisions, for example, the Court
ruled that the nondenominational content of a state-composed prayer did not remove
its constitutional infirmity,42 and it further declared, more generally, that the First
Amendment precluded governmental action that had the purpose or primary effect
of either advancing religion or inhibiting it.' In these and subsequent decisions, the
Court has consistently endorsed the general concept of religious neutrality-of
neutrality not only between and among religions, but also between religion and
nonreligion. But its particular understanding of this concept has evolved over time.
As Professor Douglas Laycock has explained, the concept of neutrality, like that
of equality, has various potential meanings.' At their most basic, however, the
requirements of denominational equality and religious neutrality would preclude
formal or deliberate discrimination, either between or among religions or between
religion and nonreligion. Taken together, and including denominational equality as
part of the broader concept of religious neutrality, these rules of nondiscrimination
might be seen to reflect a single principle, a principle that Professor Laycock calls
"formal neutrality."4 Thus, formal neutralitywould"'prohibit classificationinterms
of religion either to confer a benefit or to impose a burden."" It would preclude
formal or deliberate discrimination not only between or among religions, but also,
and more broadly, between religion and nonreligion.Y
Professor Laycock rejects formal neutrality as unduly simplistic.' What matters,
he argues, is not whether the government formally discriminates on the basis of
religion, but whether its action has the actual effect of promoting or discouraging
religion. Thus, writes Laycock, the test of neutrality should be one of "substantive
neutrality,"49 according to which the government must "minimize the extent to
41. See supra Part IHA.
42. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,430 (1962).
43. See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963). The principle of religious
neutrality was supported in earlier opinions as well. See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Educ., 330
U.S. 1,18 (1947) (declaring that the First Amendment requires government "to be neutral in
its relations with groups of religious believers and nonbelievers"). But there also were
contrary indications. See, e.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306,314 (1952) (holding thatthe
state could "encouragefl religious instruction" and "cooperate[] with religious authorities"
through areligious released-time program forpublic school students). See generally Marshall,
supra note 7, at 196-200 (arguing that the notion of religious neutrality is not new, but rather
is deeply embedded in the Supreme Court's constitutional doctrine).
44. See Laycock, supra note 8, at 995.
45. Id. at 999.
46. Id. (quoting Philip B. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U.
Cu-. L. RFV. 1, 96 (1961)); see also Mark Tushnet, "Of Church and State and the Supreme
Court". Kurland Revisited, 1989 Sup. CT. REv. 373.
47. See Laycock, supra note 8, at 999-1001.
48. See id.
49. Id. at 1001-06.
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which it either encourages or discourages religious belief or disbelief, practice or
nonpractice, observance or nonobservance," 0 leaving religion "as wholly to private
choice as anything can be."'"
As Laycock contends, substantive neutrality is an attractive normative concept,
and, from a descriptive point of view, it helps explain a variety of Supreme Court
decisions that have found formal neutrality unnecessary in certain contexts and
insufficient in others. But substantive neutrality requires difficult and sophisticated
legal judgments of a sort that formal neutrality avoids. 2 Relatedly, it requires special
treatment for religion, and to that extent it departs from the most basic, and the most
common, constitutional understanding of equality.53 Formal neutrality, by contrast,
makes religion irrelevant to government policymaking, arguably ensuring a
nondiscriminatory distribution of benefits and burdens. Thus, formal neutrality may
be the purest, and is certainly the simplest, means of implementing a policy of equal
treatment for religion and nonreligion.
In any event, and notwithstanding Laycock's arguments, formal neutrality has
become the dominant theme under both the Free Exercise and the Establishment
Clauses. As Professor Ira C. Lupu explained in his persuasive 1994 account, a trend
leading generally in this direction emerged and grew in the 1980s and early 1990s0u
Since the time of Lupu's writing, moreover, .this trend has accelerated, and the
overriding importance of formal neutrality has become even more pronounced.
1. Free Exercise Clause
Under the Supreme Court's 1878 decision in Reynolds v. United States,55 the Free
Exercise Clause provided very little protection for religious conduct.' By the 1960s
and 1970s, however, the Supreme Court's doctrine had evolved to provide significant
50. Id. at 1001.
51. Id. at 1002.
52. As Laycock concedes, "substantive neutrality is harder to apply than formal neutrality.
It requires judgments about the relative significance of various encouragements and
discouragements to religion." Id. at 1004.
53. Notably, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment operates primarily
to preclude or discourage formal or deliberate discrimination on the basis of particular
criteria, such as race or gender. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954);
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985); City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515
(1996).
54. See Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separationism, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 230
(1994). Lupu maintains that this trend tends to undermine separationism as a structural
principle, thereby shifting the focus to more individually oriented norms. See id. For a
different perspective on the Supreme Court's evolving doctrine, see Douglas Laycock, The
Underlying Unity of Separation and Neutrality, 46 EMORY L.J. 43 (1997).
55. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
56. Reynolds, holding that Mormons were not exempt from a federal ban on polygamy,
was decided during the heyday of (Protestant) Christian dominance in American law and
public life. See supra Part I.B. During this period, mainstream Christianity required little
protection from the law, and non-mainstream religions, including Mormonism, were unlikely
to receive any.
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protection for such conduct, even from general laws thatwere nondiscriminatory and
therefore formally neutral. Thus, under Sherbertv. Verner 7 and Wisconsin v. Yoder,"
general laws that had the effect of burdening religious practices were subjected to
serious judicial scrutiny, and if the government could not justify the application of
a law to religiously motivated conduct, an exemption from the law was
constitutionally required.59 Formal neutrality was not enough. Rather, the Court's
doctrine gave religious conduct at least some protection from the adverse and
discouraging effects of general and nondiscriminatory laws, to that extent advancing
the policy of substantive neutrality.
In the 1980s, the Supreme Court continued to apply the doctrinal framework of
Sherbert and Yoder, but, at least in hindsight, the Court's rejection of a series of
religious-exemption claims' pointed toward a shift from substantive neutrality to
formal neutrality, a shift that culminated in the Court's landmark decision of 1990,
Employment Division v. Smith.6 In Smith, the Court was asked to recognize a
religious exemption for the sacramental use of an otherwise illegal drug, peyote, by
members of the Native American Church. Not only did the Court refuse to do so, but
it also declined to apply the scrutiny that Sherbert and Yoder appeared to require.62
Feinting in the direction of precedent, the Court in Smith purported to distinguish
and preserve its particular holdings in Sherbert and closely similar cases,63 as well
as in Yoder," but the Court in fact rejected the fundamental teaching of those cases.
57. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
58. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
59. In Sherbert, the Court stated that only a "'compelling state interest"' could justify a
burden on religious practices. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415,438 (1963)). In Yoder, the Court wrote that "only those interests of the highest order and
those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise ofreligion."
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215.
60. In some cases, the Court articulated a standard of strict judicial scrutiny, but applied
the standard in a manner suggesting that its review was in fact more lenient. See, e.g., United
States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252,257-60 (1982); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574,
603-04 (1983). In addition, the Court adopted explicit exceptions to strict scrutiny for military
and prison regulations, which it evaluated under a reasonableness or rational basis standard.
See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507-08 (1986) (military); O'Lone v. Estate of
Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348-50 (1987) (prisons). The Court also ruled that the Free Exercise
Clause did not limit the government's internal operations, even if those operations had an
adverse effect on religious practices. See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699-701 (1986); Lyng
v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 447-53 (1988).
61. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
62. See id.
63. Prior to Smith, the Court had reaffirmed and relied upon Sherbert in several factually
similar contexts. See Thomas v. ReviewBd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Hobbie v. Unemployment
Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489
U.S. 829 (1989). The Court in Smith attempted to narrowly limit these decisions, stating that
"[v]e have never invalidated any governmental action on the basis of the Sherbert test except
the denial of unemployment compensation." Smith, 494 U.S. at 883.
64. The Court in Smith explained Yoder as a case involving a hybrid constitutional claim,
based not only on the Free Exercise Clause, but also on the constitutional right of parents to
control the education of their children. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
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Thus, the Court declared that general laws affecting religious practices do not
require any form of heightened judicial review and therefore do not require religious
exemptions.6" To grant such an exemption, the Court suggested, would be to permit
the religious believer, "by virtue of his beliefs, 'to become a law unto himself,"" a
result that "contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense."'67 Smith
essentially reduced the Free Exercise Clause to a prohibition on deliberate
governmental discrimination against religion, thatis, on governmental actiontainted
by "the unconstitutional object of targeting religious beliefs and practices."'
The Smith Court suggested that despite its ruling, legislatures were not precluded
from granting religious exemptions,69 and, with respect to the particular issue before
it, the Court noted with apparent approval that "a number of States have made an
exception to their drug laws for sacramental peyote use."70 Thus, under Smith, formal
neutrality is sufficient to satisfy the demands of the Free Exercise Clause, but this
form of neutrality is not necessarily required. Although legislatures cannot
deliberately discriminate against religion in the imposition of legal burdens," they
can, if they wish, depart from formal neutrality in order to relieve religion from the
burdens of otherwise general laws. But legislatively crafted religious exemptions
themselves are confined by constitutional limitations. According to Smith, any such
exemption must be "nondiscriminatory,"" presumably in the sense that it cannot
prefer one religion over another in violation of the requirement of denominational
65. See id. at 876-90. In so holding, the Court essentially reverted to the doctrine
embraced in its 1878 decision in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
66. Smith, 494 U.S. at 885 (quoting Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 167).
67. Id.
68. City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518 (1997).
In his contribution to this Symposium, Professor Michael J. Perry argues that the
nondiscrimination requirement of the Free Exercise Clause can and should bear considerably
more weight than the Supreme Court believes. See Michael J. Perry, Freedom ofReligion in
the United States: Fin de Si6cle Sketches, 75 IND. L.J. 295 (2000). In particular, Perry
contends that this requirement should be construed to prohibit not only discriminatory
hostility, but also selective indifference, bywhich he mean* "diminished respect and concern"
for the religious group whose religious practice is subjected to regulation. Id. at 302; cf. Kent
Greenawalt, Quo Vadis: The Status and Prospects of "Tests" Under the Religion Clauses,
1995 SuP. CT. REv. 323, 343-45 (discussing an argument similar to Perry's and suggesting
thatthe Constitution should be construed to forbid at least "self-conscious indifference" to the
plight of religious minorities). Perry goes on to support a presumptive requirement of
religious exemptions in accordance with the following rule: "If government could exempt a
religious practice from a ban to which the practice is subject without seriously compromising
either the objective the ban is designed to serve or any other important governmental
objective, but government nonetheless refuses to do so, it shall be presumed that the refusal
is based on diminished respect and concern for the religious group whose practice is banned."
Perry, supra, at 303. (footnotes omitted). Perry maintains that this rule "is simply a practical
way of implementing" the nondiscrimination requirement of the Free Exercise Clause. Id.
69. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
70. Id.
71. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
72. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
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equality.Y And if the exemption unduly favors religion, even religion in general, it
will be found to violate the Establishment Clause.74 The precise meaning of these
limitations remains to be seen, but a religious exemption, unlike formally neutral
legislation, is subject to serious constitutional scrutiny. Under Smith, formal
neutrality thus is constitutionally sufficient and also constitutionally preferable, in
that legislative departures from this norm run a serious risk of constitutional
invalidation.
As noted earlier, the idea of denominational equality was promoted in the 1960s
not only by the Supreme Court, but also by Congress, and this congressional action
helped establish denominational equality as an undisputed ingredient of American
religious liberty.75 By contrast, Congress has not embraced formal neutrality in the
free exercise context. Much to the contrary, Congress has strongly resisted the
Court's position on this matter. Thus, in response to Employment Division v. Smith,
Congress enacted the Religious FreedomRestoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA"),76 which
was designed to repudiate Smith and to once again require religious exemptions in
accordance with the pre-existing doctrinal framework of Sherbert and Yoder.' But
the Supreme Court did not stand still for this congressional impertinence. In its 1997
decision in City ofBoerne v. Flores,8 the Court invalidated RFRA, at least as applied
to state and local governmental action, ruling that RFRA exceeded the constitutional
power of Congress under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.79 As its own
rejoinder, Congress is now considering new legislation, the Religious Liberty
Protection Act ("RLPA"), which would extend its requirements to state and local
73. See Board ofEduc. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687,706-07
(1994) ("[W]hatever the limits ofpermissible legislative accommodations may be, it is clear
that neutrality as among religions must be honored.") (citations omitted).
74. Compare Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (invalidating Texas sales
tax exemption that was granted to religious literature, but not other literature), with
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (upholding statutory exemption for religious organizations from
ban on religious discrimination in employment).
75. See supra Part II.A.
76. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994).
77. See Daniel 0. Conkle, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: The Constitutional
Significance of an Unconstitutional Statute, 56 MONT. L. REV. 39, 55-60 (1995).
78. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
79. Section 5 grants Congress the power to "enforce" the Fourteenth Amendment,
including the Fourteenth Amendment's incorporation of First Amendment rights, but the
Court in Boerne concluded that RFRA went well beyond the permissible limits of
congressional "enforcement." Id.; see also Daniel 0. Conkle, CongressionalAlternatives in
the Wake of City ofBoerne v. Flores: The (Limited) Role of Congress in Protecting Religious
Freedom from State and Local Infringement, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 633, 638-45
(1998). For symposia addressing RFRA, Boerne, and related issues, see The James R.
Browning Symposium for 1994, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 56 MoNT. L. REv.
1 (1995); Does Religious Freedom Have a Future?: The First Amendment After Boeme,
NEXUS, Fall 1997, at 1 (1997); Ben J. Altheimer Symposium, Requiem for Religious
Freedom?, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 555 (1998); Symposium, Reflections on City of
Boerne v. Flores, 39 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 597 (1998).
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governments on the basis of other theories and sources of constitutional power.8n
Like RFRA, RLPA would reject formal neutrality in favor of the SherbertlYoder
framework, to that extent advancing the policy of substantive neutrality. So, too,
have various state legislatures moved in a similar direction, adopting or considering
state legislation to replace the invalidated federal RFRA.8
These legislative efforts are designed to displace the Supreme Court's preference
for formal neutrality, but whether they can or will accomplish this result is an open
question. As Boerne makes clear, legislation of this sort runs the risk of judicial
invalidation.' And even if the legislation survives, it might well be interpreted
narrowly. As the cases decided under RFRA suggest, courts are reluctant to depart
from formal neutrality, and this reluctance is likely to affect the courts' interpretive
decisionmaking.8 3 Formal neutrality remains a contested concept in the legal culture
of contemporary America,' but this concept currently dominates the law of free
exercise, and there is reason to believe that this dominance will continue.
The dominance of formal neutrality can be explained, in part, by the emergence
of a religiously neutral, autonomy-driven understanding of conscience. Thus, if the
requirement of denominational equality has the effect of leveling all religions,'
formal neutrality has the effect of leveling religious and nonreligious claims of
conscience. Claims of conscience might still receive legal protection in certa.in
contexts. For example, the Supreme Court has granted substantial constitutional
protection to "the zone of conscience and belief' that informs a woman's
80. RLPA was originally introduced in the 105th Congress. See H.R. 4019, 105th Cong.
(1998); S. 2148, 105th Cong. (1998). In revised form, it was reintroduced in the current,
106th Congress and, as amended, it was passed by the House of Representatives on July 15,
1999. See H.R. 1691, 106th Cong. (1999); 145 CONG. REc. H5608 (daily ed. July 15, 1999).
The legislation now awaits Senate action.
81. For symposia addressing post-Boerne legislative efforts in the states and in Congress,
see Symposium, Restoring Religious Freedom in the States, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 513
(1999); Symposium, State and Federal Religious Liberty Legislation: Is It Necessary? Is It
Constitutional? Is It Good Policy?, 21 CARDozo L. REv. 1 (1999).
82. On the constitutional power of Congress to enact legislation such as RLPA, thereby
once again imposing RFRA-like obligations on state and local governments, compare Thomas
C. Berg, The Constitutional Future of Religious Freedom Legislation, 20 U. ARK. LrrLE
RocK L.J. 715, 747-64 (1998) (offering a relatively broad interpretation of congressional
power) with Conkle, supra note 79, at 646-83 (offering a somewhat more narrow
interpretation). On the constitutional issues surrounding state legislation, see the symposia
cited supra note 81.
83. See Ira C. Lupu, The Failure of RFRA, 20 U. ARK. LrrrIn ROCK L.J. 575, 585-97
(1998) (discussing and explaining legal impact of RFRA, including results of RFRA
litigation); see also Scott C. Idleman, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Pushing the
Limits of Legislative Power, 73 TEx. L. REV. 247, 253-84 (1994) (explaining judicial
resistance to free exercise claims and arguing that RFRA was destined to fail).
84. In addition to the legislative resistance to formal neutrality in this context, there is
some resistance within the Supreme Court itself. In Boerne, for example, three Justices
suggested that the approach of Smith should be reconsidered. City of Boeme v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507, 544-65 (1997) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 565-66 (Souter, J., dissenting); id.
at 566 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
85. See supra text accompanying note 39.
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decisionmaking with respect to abortion.' But formal neutrality rejects the notion
ofspecialprotectionforreligious claims ofconscience. Instead, conscience is viewed
as an aspect of personal autonomy, a type of individual self-definition and self-
determination that is the prerogative of the religious and nonreligious alike. The
Court protects a woman's decision to have an abortion, for example, because it
represents a"choice] central to personal dignity and autonomy,"' a choice that falls
within "the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life.' ' 8
Under this view, we define our own consciences and determine what they require.
Our consciences might include religious obligations, but then again they might not;
it all depends on our particular self-definitions. Formal neutrality confirms and
supports this understanding of conscience. And in so doing, it severely impairs the
Founders' theological defense of religious liberty.' For the Founders, religious
obligations were obligations to God-obligations that were not only special, but also
paramount. According to the contemporary Supreme Court, by contrast, the law
requires "equal respect for the conscience of the infidel [and] the atheist."90 Under
this view, obligations to God no longer are special under the law, nor are they
especially important 9 Certain "zones of conscience" are entitled to legal protection,
but not to protect the exercise of duties owed to God. Instead, these zones, within
their reach, protect the right of individuals to define and govern their own existence.
To the extent that religious obligations fall within a protected "zone of conscience,"
they too are protected, but only as matters of self-definition and self-
determination-in effect, as obligations not to God, but to self.92
86. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992).
87. Id. at 851.
88. Id.; cf. id. at 852 ("The destiny of the woman must be shaped to a large extent on her
own conception of her spiritual imperatives and her place in society.").
89. See supra Part LA.
90. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52 (1985). See id. at 53 ("[The individual freedom
of conscience protected by the First Amendment embraces the right to select any religious
faith or none at all.").
91. Arguing that "God Is Good," Professor John H. Garvey has contended that even today,
special treatment for religion, including free exercise exemptions, can and should be defended
on explicitly religious grounds. See JOHN H. GARvEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? 42-57
(1996); see also Gregory C. Sisk, Stating the Obvious: Protecting Religion for Religion's
Sake, 47 DRAKE L. REv. 45 (1998); Michael Stokes Paulsen, God Is Great, Garvey Is Good:
Making Sense ofReligious Freedom, 42 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1597 (1997) (book review).
But as Professor Frederick Mark Gedicks has explained, Garvey's argument faces an uphill
struggle in our contemporary legal culture, as do other arguments defending exemptions for
the benefit of religious believers alone. See Frederick Mark GedicksAn Unfirm Foundation:
The Regrettable Indefensibility ofReligious Exemptions, 20 U. ARK. IrLE ROCK L.J. 555
(1998). For critical responses to Garvey's argument, see, for example, LarryAlexander, Good
God, Garvey! The Inevitability and Impossibility ofa Religious Justification ofFreeExercise
Exemptions, 47 DRAKE L. REv. 35 (1998); Marshall, supra note 7, at 206-07.
92. It might be possible to define conscience more restrictively, but without limiting itto
commitments that are religious in the traditional sense. See, e.g., Rodney K Smith,
ConvertingtheReligiousEqualityAmendment into aStatute with aLittle "Conscience," 1996
BYJL. REv. 645, 675-86 (arguing that conscience should be understood as a matter of moral
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2. Establishment Clause
The Establishment Clause drew little attentionin the Supreme Court priorto 1947,
when the Court decided Everson v. Board of Education.93 In Everson, a five-Justice
majority rejected the constitutional challenge in the case at hand,94 but all nine
Justices endorsed a broad interpretation of the Establishment Clause-an
interpretation that appeared to require not merely formal neutrality, nor even
substantive neutrality, but also a separation of religion and government. Quoting
Thomas Jefferson, the majority declared that "the clause against establishment of
religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of separation between Church and
State." 95 The four dissenters agreed, stating the separation requirement in even
stronger terms: "[Tihe object was broader than separating church and state in [a]
narrow sense. It was to create a complete and permanent separation of the spheres
of religious activity and civil authority by comprehensively forbidding every form of
public aid or support for religion."
96
By 1971, the separationist doctrine enunciated in Everson had generated the
three-pronged constitutional test of Lemon v. Kurtzman.97 This test required that
governmental action be supported by a secular purpose, that it not have the principal
or primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, and that it "not foster 'an
excessive government entanglement with religion."' 98 The first prong of the test,
precluding laws that purposefully discriminated in favor of religion, essentially
embodied a requirement of formal neutrality. The second prong, focusing on the
actual effect of the governmental action, suggested a concern for substantive
neutrality, and the third, focusing on entanglement, suggested a requirement of
separation. Whatever their precise meanings, the second and third requirements of
Lemon made it clear that formal neutrality was not sufficient under the
Establishment Clause.99
duty or obligation); Underkuffler-Freund, Foundational Challenge, supra note 22, at 963
(arguing that the focus should be "on the process of conscience, and on the purposes served
by its freedom") (emphasis in original); Laura S. Underkuffler-Freund, Yoder and the
Question of Equality, 25 CAP. U. L. Rav. 789, 801-02 (1996) [hereinafter Underkuffler-
Freund, Yoder and the Question ofEquality] (emphasizing the other-regarding, social aspect
of conscience).
93. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
94. Id. at 17-18.
95. Id. at 16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)).
96. Id. at 31-32 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
97. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
98. Id. at 612-13 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
99. Lemon, 403 U.S. 602.
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Using the Everson doctrine and the Lemon test,'0 0 the Supreme Court invalidated
numerous governmental practices, including practices that appeared to satisfy the
requirement of formal neutrality. In particular, the Court struck down various
legislative efforts to provide financial and other support for private religious schools,
even through programs that did not single out the religious schools or their students
for special, beneficial treatment."' In its 1985 decisions in School District v. Ball"
and Aguilar v. Felton," for example, the Court used the second and third prongs of
Lemon to preclude publicly funded teachers from providing secular, remedial
education on the premises of religious schools, even though the programs in question
extended to religious and nonreligious schools alike.'4 Despite the formal neutrality
of the programs before it, the Court was concerned that they would in fact advance
the religious mission of religious schools"05 or else result in undue governmental
monitoring of the programs and therefore an impermissible entanglement of religion
and government."'
In Ball and Aguilar, formal neutrality was not enough to satisfy the Establishment
Clause. Only one year later, however, in Witters v. Washington Department of
Servicesfor the Blind,"'7 the Court held that the Establishment Clause did not forbid
an award of public funding to help a blind college student obtain a religious
education in preparation for a religious career. ' The funding was neutrally available
to "'assistvisually handicapped persons to overcome vocational handicaps,"".. 9 and,
as Justice Powell explained in his concurring opinion, a program that is "wholly
neutral in offering educational assistance to a class defined without reference to
religion" does not imply governmental support for religion, "because any aid to
religion results from the private choices of individual beneficiaries."t"' In later cases,
100. As a refinement of the Lemon test, the Court sometimes emphasized the "endorsement
or disapproval" inquiry that was initially proposed by Justice O'Connor, according to which
the critical inquiry was whether the government's action, either in actual purpose or
reasonable perception, worked to endorse or disapprove religious beliefs. See Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-94 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also, e.g., Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 585 (1987); County of
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592-94 (1989).
101. See, e.g., School Dist. V. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402
(1985); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975);
Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472 (1973); Committee of Pub. Educ. v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). During this same
period, other programs of public support survived constitutional scrutiny, with the Supreme
Court often relying on fine distinctions. See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983);
Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980).
102. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
103. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
104. Ball, 473 U.S. 373; Aguilar, 473 U.S. 402.
105. See Ball, 473 U.S. at 384-97.
106. See Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 409.
107.474 U.S. 481 (1986).
108. Id. at 489.
109. Id. at 483 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 74.16.181 (1981)).
110. Id. at490-91 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell argued thatthe Supreme Court's
earlier decision in Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983), strongly supported the
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the Court extended Witters even as it limited Ball and Aguilar. Thus, in Zobrest v.
Catalina Foothills School District,"' it upheld the use of a general program of
funding to provide a publicly funded sign-language interpreter for a deaf student at
a religious school, noting that "governmental programs that neutrally provide
benefits to a broad class of citizens defined without reference to religion are-not
readily subject to an Establishment Clause challenge.""' 2 And in Bowen v.
Kendrick,"3 the Court concluded that even religious organizations sometimes can
receive governmental funding under neutrally drawn programs; in particular, it
upheld a federal program authorizing grants to religiously affiliated as well as other
organizations for counseling and research relating to teenage sexuality and
pregnancy. 114
Some ten years after Ball and Aguilar, the Supreme Court had largely abandoned
the reasoning of those cases, and, indeed, the Court expressly rejected that reasoning
inAgostini v. Felton,"5 a 1997 decision that overruled Aguilar and key portions of
Ball as well." 6 InAgostini, the Court stressed the importance of formal neutrality in
concluding, contrary to Ball and Aguilar, that the Establishment Clause did not
preclude publicly funded teachers from teaching secular, remedial courses on the
premises of religious schools under a federally funded program that supported
teaching at nonreligious schools as well. Although the Court also relied on other
considerations," 7 it suggested that Establishment Clause invalidation would be
unlikely when "aid is allocated on the basis of neutral, secular criteria that neither
favor nor disfavor religion, and is made available to both religious and secular
beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory basis.""'
In the decisions that limited and eventually repudiated Ball and Aguilar, the
Supreme Court has implied that, at least in general, formal neutrality is
constitutionally permissible in the provision of public benefits. If so, then the
government may, but need not, include religious beneficiaries within the reach of its
otherwise general programs. In its most dramatic endorsement of formal neutrality
in the award of public benefits, however, the Supreme Court recently has indicated
that the extension of funding to religious beneficiaries sometimes is constitutionally
required by nondiscrimination principles emanating from the First Amendment's
protection of freedom of speech and press. Thus, in its 1995 decision inRosenberger
constitutionality of this sort of formally neutral program. See Witters, 474 U.S. at 490-92
(Powell, J., concurring).
111. 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
112. Id. at 8.
113. 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
114. Id.
115. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
116. Id. at 235-36. For an argument that Agostini's procedural context made it a poor
vehicle for doctrinal transformation, see Hugh Baxter, Managing Legal Change: The
Transformation ofEstablishment Clause Law, 46 UCLA L. REV. 343 (1998).
117. For instance, the Court noted that the federally funded education was "supplemental
to the regular curricula" and that no federal funds "ever reach the coffers of religious
schools." Agostini, 521 U.S. at 228.
118. Id. at 231.
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v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia,"9 the Court ruled that if the
University of Virginia wished to maintain an otherwise neutral and general program
of funding for the publications and activities of student organizations, the
Constitution not only permitted funding for a religious publication, but also required
it" 0 As in the free exercise context, then, there is at least some indication that the
Supreme Court regards formal neutrality as not onlypermissible in the establishment
context, but also constitutionally preferable, and indeed required in certain
situations.
The Establishment Clause certainly is not moribund. The Supreme Court
continues to invalidate laws that purposefully favor religion in violation of the
requirement of formal neutrality, 2' and itis especially-vigorous in ferreting out such
deliberate favoritism in the context ofthepublic schools." Beyond the requirement
of formal neutrality, moreover, the Court's doctrine retains other remnants of the
119. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
120. See id. at 845-46. In so holding, the Court extended the reasoning of earlier cases that
had required that individuals seeking to engage in religious worship or expression be granted
equal access to physical facilities that the government had otherwise made open for secular
expression. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches
Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
121. In Board ofEduc. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994),
for example, the Court invalidated a New York law that had created a special school district
foraHasidic Jewish community in circumstances indicating a"purposeful delegation [of civic
authority] on the basis of religion," as opposed to "a delegation on principles neutral to
religion." Id. at 699.
In the current Symposium, Professor Michael J. Perry arguesthat the Establishment Clause
should be interpreted to permit a limited degree of purposeful governmental favoritism of
religion. In particular, he argues that an appropriately "moderate" understanding of the
Establishment Clause permits the government to affirm a few "very basic religious beliefs,"
including the belief that God exists, as long as the government acts in a noncoercive manner.
Perry, supra note 68, at 310. I have defended a somewhat similar position, although my
argument would permit noncoercive governmental affirmations of religion only if they are
embodied in longstanding, traditional governmental practices. See Conide, supra note 12, at
1183-87.
Professor Frederick Mark Gedicks, by contrast, contends that the Supreme Court's
prevailing ideology permits it to uphold governmental affirmations of religious beliefs or
practices only by denying or ignoring their religious significance. See Frederick Mark
Gedicks, Government Appropriation of Religion: A Critical Interpretation (July 22, 1999)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Indiana Law Journal). As a result, Gedicks favors
an Establishment Clause jurisprudence that prohibits governmental acknowledgment of such
beliefs and practices "precisely because of their rich theological significance." Id. at 3.
122. In Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987), for example, the Court invalidated a
statute requiring "balanced treatment" for the teaching of "creation science" and "evolution
science." Noting that "[t]he Court has been particularly vigilant in monitoring compliance
with the Establishment Clause in elementary and secondary schools," id. at 583-84, the Court
concluded that the statute's articulated secular purpose was a "sham" and that its actual
purpose was to advance religion. Id. at 585-94. In its more recent decisioninvalidating school-
sponsored graduation prayer, the Court's reasoning was more complex, but it once again
invalidated a public school policy that deliberately favored religion. See Lee v. Weisman, 505
U.S. 577 (1992).
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Lemon test, remnants that suggest lingering concerns about substantive neutrality
and separation. In Agostini, for example, the Court linked its approval of formal
neutrality to the policy of substantive neutrality, noting that the nondiscriminatory
program it was evaluating-precisely because of its nondiscriminatory
character-did not "have the effect of advancing religion by creating a financial
incentive" for aid recipients "to modify their religious beliefs or practices."" In
other contexts, formal neutrality and substantive neutrality might point in different
directions, and the Court might rule that formal neutrality is insufficient. At least in
the context of holiday displays, for example, the Court continues to suggest that even
if the government has not purposefully favored or endorsed religion, a reasonable
perception of favoritism or endorsement is enough to preclude the governmental
action. "'24 Beyond formal and substantive neutrality, moreover, the policy of
separation may retain some force. Thus, even in the context of neutral programs, the
Court has yet to approve the direct payment of tax money to organizations that are
not only religiously affiliated, but also "pervasively sectarian,"'"1 nor has it approved
the direct funding of "specifically religious activities."' 26
123. Agostini, 521 U.S at 231. More generally, the Court stated that it would continue to
ask not only "whether the government acted with the purpose of advancing or inhibiting
religion," but also "whether the aid has the 'effect' of advancing or inhibiting religion." Id.
at 223. The Court likewise suggested that excessive "entanglement" remained a potential
issue. Id. at 230-32. But the Court made it clear that its inquiry into "effect" would be guided
by criteria substantially more relaxed than earlier cases had indicated, and it suggested that
the "entanglement" issue would now be subsumed within this more general and relaxed
"effect" analysis. Id. at 218-30, 232.
124. The Court so held in County ofAllegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 598-602 (1989),
and five Justices reaffinmed this basic principle in their separate opinions in Capitol Square
Review Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995). See Pinette, 515 U.S. at 771-83 (O'Connor, J.,
joined by Souter and Breyer, JJ., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at
783-94 (Souter, J.,joined by O'Connor and Breyer, JJ., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment); id. at 799-812 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 817-18 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
One could argue that this doctrine does not meaningfully depart from formal neutrality, in
that it does little more than simplify the search for purposeful endorsement. On this view, a
reasonable perception of governmental endorsement is enough to suggest the likelihood of
purposeful governmental endorsement and therefore a violation of formal neutrality. Even so,
the doctrine precludes the government from taking certain action that has the effect of
advancing religion even when purposeful advancement has not been clearly demonstrated; to
that extent, the doctrine can be seen to move beyond formal neutrality and in the direction of
substantive neutrality.
125. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 609-11, 620-21 (1988). But cf. id. at 624-25
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing that extension of funding to pervasively sectarian
institutions should not be declared unconstitutional unless "the funds are in fact being used
to further religion").
126. Id. at 611-15, 621-22 (majority opinion). But cf. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of
the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 837-46 (1995) (approving neutral extension of public
university funding, drawn from mandatory student fees, for printing of a Christian magazine,
with money being paid directly to a third-party printer); id. at 842 (emphasizing that "no
public funds flow directly to [the Christian magazine's] coffers").
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Beyond the Court's own doctrinal caveats, moreover, a substantial group of
dissenting Justices has protested the trend toward formal neutrality. In the Court's
1995 and 1997 decisions in Rosenberger and Agostini, for example, four Justices
dissented from the Court's approval of the formally neutral funding programs, and
their dissenting opinions evinced a decidedly more separationist philosophy.' 7
No less than in the context of free exercise, then, formal neutrality remains a
contested concept under the Establishment Clause. But it is equally plain, here no
less than there, that formal neutrality has become the dominant theme in the
Supreme Court's doctrine. As a result, governmental programs that are formally
neutral, including general programs of financial support for private individuals or
organizations, are likely to be upheld--even if they may have the effect of advancing
religion (along with other ideas or activities) and even if they create the risk of
entanglement between religion and government.
Unlike in the free exercise context, moreover, it appears that Congress does not
resist, but instead supports, the Supreme Court's emphasis on formal neutrality
under the Establishment Clause. It was Congress, after all, that enacted the laws
approved by the Supreme Court in Bowen v. Kendrick and in Agostini, laws that
extended federally funded programs to religious organizations and individuals and
that thereby pushed the Court in the direction of formal neutrality. 8 Indeed, it
appears that a majority of Congress, or at least a majority of the House of
Representatives, would support even further movement in this direction. Thus, a
proposed constitutional amendment, the "Religious Freedom Amendment," would
expressly forbid the government from "discriminat[ing] against religion" or
"deny[ing] equal access to a benefit on account of religion,"'2 9 thereby confirming
and expanding the idea that formal neutrality is not only constitutionally permissible
in the provision of governmental benefits, but also constitutionally required. In a
1998 vote in the House of Representatives, this proposal failed to obtain the two-
thirds margin required for constitutional amendments, but it was supported by a
majority of the Representatives.'
In the Establishment Clause context, the dominance of formal neutrality can be
seen as a boon for religion, permitting-and perhaps .encouraging or even
requiring-the government to treat religion on par with nonreligion in the provision
of funding and other public benefits.' For example, formal neutrality supports the
127. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 863-92 (Souter, J., joined by Stevens, Ginsburg, and
Breyer, JJ., dissenting);Agostini, 521 U.S. at 240-54 (1997) (Souter, J.,joined by Stevens and
Ginsburg, JJ., and joined in part by Breyer, J., dissenting). In the free exercise context as
well, some Justices have protested the Court's move toward formal neutrality. See supra note
84.
128. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988);Agostini, 521 U.S. 203.
129. H.R.J. Res. 78, 105th Cong. (1998).
130. The proposed amendment, which also would have recognized "the people's right to
pray and to recognize their religious beliefs, heritage, or traditions on public property,
including schools," id., received 224 votes, compared to 203 in opposition. See 144 CONG.
REc. H4112 (daily ed. June 4, 1998).
131. For a volume of essays discussing-from various perspectives-the idea of "equal
treatment" in this context, see EQUAL TREATMENT OF RELIGION IN A PLURALISTIC SOCIETY
(Stephen V. Monsma & J. Christopher Soper eds., 1998).
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inclusion of religious schools in publicly funded voucher programs, such as the
Milwaukee program that was upheld by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in 1998.132
But this seeming boon may be an illusion.
In the first place, formal neutrality in the establishment context ignores the risk
that religion can be neutralized, homogenized, and secularized when it participates
in governmental programs, programs that inevitably include governmentally
imposed conditions that participants must honor." Under the Milwaukee voucher
program, for example, religious schools cannot participate if they require students
to take part in religious education; such education must be voluntary, with objecting
students permitted to opt out. 34 Over time, moreover, the funding conditions are
likely to expand even as the participating religious organizations become more and
132. See Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998).
In her contribution to this Symposium, Professor Laura S. Underkuffler disputes the
Establishment Clause analysis that would permit this result. See Laura S. Underkuffler,
Vouchers and Beyond: The Individual as Causative Agent in Establishment Clause
Jurisprudence, 75 IND. L.J. 167 (2000). In his contribution, by contrast, Professor Michael J.
Perry contends that this result is not only permitted by the Establishment Clause, but also
required by the Free Exercise Clause. See Perry, supra note 68, at 323-24; see also Eugene
Volokh, Equal Treatment Is Not Establishment, 13 NoTRE DAMm J.L. ETHcs & PuB. POL'Y
341 (1999) (elaborating a position similar to Perry's).
Without endorsing Perry's argument, Professor Martha M. McCarthy suggests that such a
holding might well be the "next logical step" for the Supreme Court. Martha M. McCarthy,
Religion and Education: Whither the Establishment Clause?, 75 IND. L.J. 123, 164 (2000).
More generally, McCarthy provides a well-documented account of the Establishment Clause
trend toward formal neutrality as it relates to both public and private education. See id. at
123-66.
Constitutional challenges relating to vouchers and similar programs recently have produced
competing results in the lower courts. See, e.g., Jackson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (upholding
inclusion ofreligious schools in Milwaukee voucher program); Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d
606 (Ariz. 1999) (upholding program of tax credits extending to contributions made to
religious schools); Bagley v. Raymond Sch. Dept., 728 A.2d 127 (Me. 1999) (upholding
exclusion of religious schools from Maine's education tuition program and concluding that
inclusion of such schools would be unconstitutional); Strout v. Albanese, 178 F.3d 57 (1 st Cir.
1999) (reaching same result as Bagley); Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203 (Ohio
1999) (invalidating Cleveland voucher program on state-law grounds, but suggesting that
program's inclusion of religious schools is not unconstitutional); Simmons-Harris v. Zelman,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15117 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 24, 1999) (concluding, contrary to Ohio
Supreme Court, that Cleveland voucherprogram probably violates Establishment Clause, and
issuing preliminary injunction on that basis),preliminary injunction stayed, 1999 U.S. LEXIS
7480 (U.S. Nov. 5, 1999).
For recent symposia addressing the constitutionality of voucher programs and other
programs that extend public funding to religious recipients, see Commentary on School
Vouchers and the Establishment Clause, 31 CONN. L. REV. 803 (1999); Symposium on Law
and Religion, 13 NoTRE DAME J.L. ETHIcs & PuB. POL'Y 239 (1999).
133. This is not to deny that the exclusion ofreligious organizations from general programs
likewise can produce significant secularizing pressures. See Volokh, supra note 132, at 363-
65.
134. See Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 609, 617.
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more dependent on the government's financial support. 35 No less than the stick of
direct regulation, the carrot of governmental funding may work to the long-term
detriment of religion, inducing religious organizations to modify and weaken their
religious practices and requirements in response to secular demands. 1"
135. Citing the lessons of Reformation history, Barry Hankins has warned that
governmental funding carries a serious risk of"creeping regulation." Barry Hankins, Through
theBackDoor: MartinLutherand Welfare Reform, LIBERTY, May/June 1999, at 23, 26. Over
time, he suggests, vouchers and similar funding programs might "fundamentally alter
America's unique church-state arrangement in ways more problematic for the churches than
for the state." Id. at 27. Quoting Harro H6pfl, Hankins notes that when the Protestant
Reformers pursued similar church-state partnerships, they soon learned "'what indeed they
might have anticipated, namely that the favor of princes is fitful and unreliable, and never
comes without strings."' Id. (quoting Lum AND CALviN ON SECULAR AuTHORrrY at ix
(Harro H6pfl ed. & trans., 1991)).
Based on an empirical study, Professor Stephen V. Monsma has concluded that most
religious organizations receiving public money in the United States presently operate "free
from severe limitations on their freedom to live out their religious commitments and
beliefs-whether from the government itself, limitations arising from private individuals or
groups, or self-imposed limitations." STEPHEN V. MONSMA, WHEN SACRED AND SECULAR
Mix: RmIGIOUS NONPROFrr ORGANizATONs AND PUBLIC MONEY 105 (1996). But Monsma
notes that there are significant and troubling exceptions, and he adds that "there are warning
signs on the horizon" indicating that the religious autonomy that currently exists "is in an
unsafe, precarious position." Id.; see also id. at 63-108, 147-66.
For helpful commentary in the particular context of school voucher programs, see Alan E.
Brownstein, Evaluating School Voucher Programs Through a Liberty, Equality, and Free
Speech Matrix, 31 CONN. L. Rv. 871,895-902 (1999) (discussing potential effects of school
voucher programs on religion and religious liberty); Mark Tushnet, Will Context-Dependent
Balancing Do the Job We Want Done?, 31 CONN. L. REv. 861, 861-64 (1999) (discussing
risks to religion and religious liberty that might arise from school voucher programs and
explaining why these risks are constitutionally relevant despite their voluntary assumption by
participating religious schools).
136. Arguing for the inclusion of religious organizations in formally neutral funding
programs, Professor Perry seems largely unconcerned about funding conditions and their
possible effects on the integrity ofreligious organizations. See Perry, supra note 68, at 321-22
ni 84-86 (suggesting that funding may be subject to "certain appropriate limitations,"
including, but presumably not limited to, conditions precluding recipient organizations from
discriminating on the basis of race or sex). But as Perry himself cautions later in his article,
"One way for government to corrupt religion-to co-opt it, to drain it of its prophetic
potential-is to seduce religion to get in bed with government; an important way to protect
religion, therefore, is to forbid such intimacy." Id. at 330.
Like Professor Perry, Professor Carl H. Esbeck supports the inclusion of religious
organizations in formally neutral funding programs. See Carl H. Esbeck, A Constitutional
Case for Governmental Cooperation with Faith-Based Social Service Providers, 46 EMORY
L.J. 1 (1997). Esbeck concedes that "ft]he most compelling argument for a continued strict
separation of church and state is the harm that can befall religion itself when faith-based
ministries become unduly involved with governmental programs and benefits," and he admits
that this harm is "real and threatening." Id. at 19-20 & n.74. Even so, Esbeck apparently is
content to leave the autonomy of religious organizations primarily in the hands of the
legislature, which he urges to adopt appropriate safeguards. See id. at 19-20, 37, 39. But cf
Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment ClauseAs a StructuralRestraint on GovernmentalPower,
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More generally, formal neutrality in the establishment context also confirms the
leveling ofreligion and nonreligion, therebyreinforcingtheliberty-restncting effects
of formal neutrality in the free exercise context. Indeed, to adopt formal neutrality
in one context but not the other might suggest doctrinal and theoretical
inconsistency: if religion is to be treated like nonreligion in the receipt of generally
available benefits, why should it be excused from the imposition of generally
applicable burdens? 37
According to Professor Mark DeWolfe Howe, Roger Williams maintained that
"government must have nothing to do with religion lest in its clumsy desire to favor
the churches or its savage effort to injure religion it bring the corruptions of the
wilderness into the holiness of the garden."'" No less today than in Williams's
colonial times, the separation of church and state can serve the interests not only of
government, but also of religion.'39 Formal neutrality in the establishment context
sometimes may serve the interests of religion, but it also may threaten the vibrant
freedom that can result from more vigorous understandings of the Establishment
Clause, understandings that include considerations relating to substantive neutrality
and separation.14
84 IowAL. REv. 1, 95-96 (1998) (suggesting that certain types of program conditions might
violate the Constitution, including the Establishment Clause understood as a structural
restraint on governmental power). See generally Michael Stokes Paulsen, A Funny Thing
Happened on the Way to the Limited Public Forum: Unconstitutional Conditions on "Equal
Access" for Religious Speakers and Groups, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653 (1996) (urging
recognition of constitutional protection against intrusive conditions affecting religious
organizations, even when they accept public funding under general programs).
137. See Gedicks, supra note 91, at 570-71; cf. FREDERICKMARKGEDICKS, TmRHETOPIc
OF CHURCH AND STATE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF RELIGION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE 11
(1995) (suggesting that in each context, the prevailing rhetoric of secular individualism
supports the approach of formal neutrality).
138. MARK DEWOLFE HowE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND
GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 149 (1965). The views of Roger
Williams in fact were rich and complex, and so too are their potential implications for
contemporary issues of religious liberty. For interesting and provocative discussions, see
TnIoTHY L. HALL, SEPARATING CHuRCH AND STATE: ROGER WLIAMS AND RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY (1998); Steven D. Smith, Separation and the Fanatic, 85 VA. L. REV. 213 (1999)
(reviewing TIMOTHY L. HALL, SEPARATING CHURCH AND STATE: ROGER WLLmS AND
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (1998)).
139. See HoWE, supra note 138, at 11 ("The ultimate strength of our religious
establishment is derived... not from the favoring acts of government, but, in largest measure,
from the continuing force of the evangelical principle of separation."); Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421, 432 (1962) (quoting James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against
Religious Assessments, in 2 THE WRrrINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183, 187 (Gaillard Hunt ed.
1901)) ("[R]eligion is too personal, too sacred, too holy, to permit its 'unhallowed perversion'
by a civil magistrate.").
140. As Professor Scott C. Idleman explains in his contribution to this Symposium, one
important principle of separation, the general prohibition on legal adjudication of religious
questions, may be traced to the Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause, or both. See
Scott C. Idleman, Tort Liability, Religious Entities, and the Decline of Constitutional
Protection, 75 IND. L.J. 219, 219-27 (2000). Whatever its precise constitutional grounding,
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III. A LOOK TO THE FUTURE: FORMAL NEUTRALITY
AND LITTLE MORE?
Despite the competing themes and caveats that I have noted, it seems plain that
contemporary constitutional law favors formal neutrality under both the Free
Exercise and the Establishment Clauses. Thus, under each clause, formal neutrality
generally is constitutionally permissible and constitutionally preferable, and it
sometimes is constitutionally required. Under the Free Exercise Clause, formal
neutrality denies special protection for religiously motivated conduct and thereby
restricts the scope of religious liberty. Under the Establishment Clause, the
immediate impact of formal neutrality may seem beneficial for religion, but its long-
term effect, at least in some contexts, may be to contaminate and secularize religion.
Even in the establishment context, then, formal neutrality may indirectly impede the
exercise of religious liberty.
More fundamentally, under both clauses, formal neutrality severely undermines
the theoretical foundation of American religious liberty by subverting the original
theology on which it was grounded. Contrary to the original theology, the doctrine
of formal neutrality implies that religion is neither distinct nor distinctly important.
Indeed, it implies that religion is virtually an irrelevancy, to be treated under the
Constitution in the same way that race is treated under the Constitution. On this
view, religion, like race, would have constitutional significance, but only in the sense
that it would be deemed a constitutionally forbidden or disfavored basis for
governmental discrimination or decisionmaking."4' Otherwise, it would not be
entitled to any form of special constitutional solicitude.
If I am right, the contemporary dominance of formal neutrality has adverse-or
at least potentially adverse-consequences for religion and religious liberty. But
these consequences will be enduring only if formal neutrality is enduring. As the
meaning of religious liberty continues to evolve overtime, perhaps formal neutrality
will fade away, only to be replaced by the return of earlier doctrinal frameworks or,
perhaps, by the adoption of some new framework that we cannot as yet anticipate.
Perhaps. But for the immediate future, at least, various factors suggest that formal
neutrality will remain firmly entrenched as the dominantprincipleunderthe religion
clauses and, indeed, that this principle may grow even more important as we enter
the new century and new millennium.
this principle departs from formal neutrality by treating religious questions differently than
nonreligious questions. See id. at 220-39. Advancing an argument complementary to my own,
however, Idleman contends that this principle is likely to erode in the years ahead, at least in
the context of tort liability, giving way to the general drive toward formal neutrality. See id.
at 239-71.
141. For a summary of the Supreme Court's equal protection doctrine as it relates to
discrimination based on race and other criteria, see infra Part lIlA
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A. The Importance of Formal Equality in America's
Constitutional andLegal Culture
Formal neutrality disfavors deliberate orpurposeful discrimination, either between
or among religions or between religion and nonreligion. As suggested earlier," this
principle tracks the most basic, and the most common, constitutional understanding
of equality, an understanding that might be characterized as formal equality. And the
idea of equality, so understood, has never been more important as a constituent
element of American constitutionalism. Thus, in the last fifty years, the Supreme
Court has ruled time and again that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment disfavors deliberate or purposeful discrimination on thebasis of criteria
that the Court regards as constitutionally offensive.'
The modem era of formal equality can be traced to the Supreme Court's 1954
decision in Brown v. Board of Education,'TM the effects of which continue to
reverberate. As Professor Archibald Cox proclaimed a decade after Brown, "Once
loosed, the idea of Equality is not easily cabined." 45 Later developments certainly
have proved Cox's point, at least in the sense of formal equality.
In Brown and its progeny, the Court outlawed formal or deliberate segregation on
the basis of race, not only in the public schools," but in other public facilities as
well. 4 7 More generally, the Court has extended its strict constitutional scrutiny to all
forms ofrace-based classifications and race-based decisionmaking,M including race-
based affirmative action.'49 And it has determined that the federal government,
although not limited by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
is constrained by similar principles under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Although this doctrine of "reverse incorporation" is historically
142. See supra text accompanying note 53.
143. Although formal equality has been the dominant theme in the modem Court's
interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause, it has not been the only theme in the Court's
complex and multifaceted doctrine. See GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 628-916 (13th ed. 1997); JoHN E. NoWAK & RoNALD D. RoTUNDA,
CONSTTUTONALLAW 595-959 (5th ed. 1995).
144. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
145. Archibald Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term-Foreword: Constitutional
Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 91 (1966).
146. Brown, 347 U.S. 483.
147. See, e.g., Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (beaches); Holmes v.
Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (golf courses); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (buses);
New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (parks); Turner
v. Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962) (municipal airport restaurants); Johnson v. Virginia, 373
U.S. 61 (1963) (courtrooms).
148. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidating ban on interracial
marriage); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (overturning child custody decision
grounded on racial considerations); Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985) (invalidating
racially motivated disenfranchisement provision in Alabama Constitution); Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (ruling that equal protection forbids racially motivated
peremptory challenges of jurors).
149. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Adarand Constr., Inc.
v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
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untenable,'" the constitutional norm of equality is so strong that any other result
would be "unthinkable.''
After some hesitation," the Court extended a presumption of constitutional
invalidity to formal or deliberate discrimination based on gender, 53 illegitimate
birth," and, in most contexts, alienage. 55 And even outside the context of these
explicitly recognized "suspect" or "quasi-suspect" classifications, the Court has
invalidated formal or deliberate discrimination on the basis of other criteria, such as
mental retardation and sexual orientation, when, in the eyes of the Court, the
discrimination could not be justified." And the Court's decisionmaking has been
supported and supplemented in the broader legal culture by the adoption of
antidiscrimination laws of all sorts. Although these laws sometimes go further, they
include at their core a prohibition on formal or deliberate discrimination. Thus, there
are federal statutes precluding discrimination in various contexts and on the basis
of various criteria,'57 and there also are state and local enactments that sometimes
150. That is, an earlier constitutional amendment, the Fifth, is essentially interpreted to
include the content of a later one, the Fourteenth.
151. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954); see also Adarand, 515 U.S. at 225-27.
152. See, e.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (invalidating illegitimacy-based
classification on basis of opinion that ambiguously suggested possibility of heightened
constitutional scrutiny); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (invalidating gender-based
classification while purporting to avoid heightened constitutional scrutiny); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (invalidating gender-based classification with no majority
rationale, but with plurality urging standard of strict judicial scrutiny).
153. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515
(1996). In the context of gender, the presumption of invalidity does not trigger the strictest
form of judicial scrutiny, but it does mean that gender-based classifications "must serve
important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives." Craig, 429 U.S. at 197. Under this test, when the government classifies on the
basis of gender, there must be an "exceedingly persuasive justification." Virginia, 518 U.S.
at 531. In Craig, the Court invalidated a law that forbade males, but not females, from
purchasing 3.2% beer iftheywere overthe age of 18 butunderthe age of2l. In UnitedStates
v. Virginia, the Court ruled that the Equal Protection Clause required the Virginia Military
Institute to discontinue its traditional policy, dating from 1839, that had barred the admission
ofwomen. For other cases involving gender-based discrimination, see GuNTmER& SuLuVAN,
supra note 143, at 681-720.
154. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456,461 (1988) (declaring that illegitimacy would be
treated like gender, meaning that the Court would deem discrimination based on illegitimacy
unconstitutional unless "substantially related to an important governmental objective").
155. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (holdingthat states cannot deny
welfare benefits to aliens); Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216 (1984) (holding that states cannot
preclude aliens from becoming notaries public). Due to the special role of Congress in
regulating aliens, as well as their special political status, the Court has applied more
deferential scrutiny to federal regulations of aliens and to state laws precluding aliens from
certain types of governmental employment. See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976)
(upholding federal law restricting aliens' eligibility for Medicare); Foley v. Connelie, 435
U.S. 291 (1978) (upholding state law barring employment of aliens as state troopers).
156. See, e.g., Cleburne v. Clebume Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (mental
retardation); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (sexual orientation).
157. See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1994);
2000]
INDIANA LA W JO URNAL
impose antidiscrimination prohibitions going beyond the requirements of federal
law.1
Given the ever-increasing importance of formal equality under the Equal
Protection Clause and in the legal culture generally, it is hardly surprising that an
analogous or parallel doctrine, formal neutrality, has risen to prominence under the
religion clauses." 9 Equality in the sense of nondiscrimination is a simple and
powerful principle for avoiding governmental action that relies on criteria that the
Constitution makes irrelevant. And if the Constitution in fact makes religion
irrelevant-rather than distinct and distinctly important-then why not adopt a
similar principle here? The concept of formal equality strongly supports the concept
of formal neutrality, and there is no reason to believe that either concept vill be
"cabined" anytime soon. 6
B. The Problem of Definition
According to the original theology of American religious liberty, religion was
distinct and distinctly important because it entailed duties owed to God.' However
Protestant this original theology might have been, 6 1 the defining characteristic of
Title II of the Civil RightsAct of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1994) (forbidding discrimination
in public accommodations based on race, color, religion, or national origin); Title VII of the
Civil RightsAct of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994) (forbidding employment discrimination
based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin); Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C.
§ 3604 (1994) (forbidding housing discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex,
handicap, familial status, or national origin); Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
12101-213 (1994) (forbidding discrimination based on disability in various contexts,
including employment, public services, and public accommodations).
158. A number of states and localities, for example, have extended their antidiscrimination
laws to include discrimination based on sexual orientation. Cf. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620
(1996) (invalidating state constitutional amendment that would have nullified and precluded
state and local policies of this sort).
159. See Gedicks, supra note 91, at 571 ("[A] society committed to individual equality
cannot explain why believers should be deprived of benefits or relieved of burdens which are
equally distributed and fully justified on secular grounds."); cf. Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing
the Establishment Clause: The CaseAgainstDiscretionaryAccommodation ofReligion, 140
U. PA. L. REV. 555, 580 (1991) ("Equal religious liberty is simply one of a series of parallel
constitutional commitments-equal respect for ideas, for consciences, for privacy, for racial,
ethnic, or religious identity, and for voluntary associational choices.").
160. In his contribution to this Symposium, Professor Frederick Mark Gedicks outlines
some possible implications of an equal protection approach to religious liberty. See Frederick
Mark Gedicks, The Normalized Free Exercise Clause: Three Abnormalities, 75 IND. L.J. 77
(2000). In particular, he contends that the Supreme Court's protection of formal equality in
the context of affirmative action implies that legislatively granted religious exemptions,
arguably a type of affirmative action, should not be tolerated unless they are designed to
compensate for special Establishment Clause disabilities. See id. at 99-103. At the same time,
Gedicks argues that the "fundamental interests" strand of equal protection could and should
be construed to offer some protection for religious free exercise. See id.
161. See supra Part I.A.
162. See supra text accompanying note 19.
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religion-the performance of duties owed to God-was sufficiently clear and
sufficiently broad to extend quite readily to other traditional religions as well,
including, for example, Catholic Christianity and Judaism. As religious diversity
grew in America, religious liberty did not always follow, 63 but the definition of
religion was not the obstacle. In fact, the definition of religion, for purposes of
religious liberty, did not become a serious question until the latter half of the
twentieth century.
In its 1965 decision in United States v. Seeger,"6 the Supreme Court addressed a
statutory religious-liberty provision that protected religious objectors to military
service. In its definition of religion, the statute referred to "'an individual's belief in
a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any
human relation, but [not including] essentially political, sociological, or
philosophical views or a merely personal moral code."' 6 5 To the Founders, this
definition would have seemed entirely unexceptional. But by 1965, the definition
seemed problematic to the Supreme Court-so much so that the Court saw fit to
rewrite the statute through creative interpretation. Thus, the Court declared that the
statute's definition would be interpreted to include any "sincere and meaningful"
belief that "occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the
orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies for the exemption."' 66 So
understood, the definition did "not distinguish between externally and internally
derived beliefs,"'67 and it included the beliefs of a conscientious objector who
acknowledged his skepticism concerning the existence of God, but who claimed a
"'belief in and devotion to goodness and virtue for their own sakes, and a religious
faith in a purely ethical creed.'"'I'
Seeger's expansive understanding of religion reflected the rapidly changing
character of religion in the United States. As the Court observed, American religion
was remarkably diverse by the 1960s, and it extended well beyond the traditional
confines of Christianity and Judaism.'69 Perhaps more important, modem theology
was transforming certain strands of the traditional faiths themselves. For example,
Protestant theologian Paul Tillich had concluded that God should no longer be
understood "as a projection 'out there' or beyond the skies but as the ground of our
very being."' ,"'The source of... meaning within meaningless,"' wrote Tillich, "'is
not the God of traditional theism but the "God above God," the power of being,
163. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (refusing to protect Mormons
from federal ban on polygamy).
164. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
165. Id. at 165 (quoting 50 U.S.C. app. § 4560) (1958) (amended 1967)) (alteration in
original).
166. Id. at 166.
167. Id. at 186.
168. Id. at 166 (quoting Record at 73). Professor Rebecca Redwood French has suggested
that Seeger was "the first step by the Court into a postmodemist depiction of religion."
Rebecca Redwood French, From Yoder to Yoda: Models of Traditional, Modern, and
Postmodern Religion in U.S. Constitutional Law, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 49, 78 (1999).
169. See Seeger, 380 U.S. at 174-75.
170. Id. at 180.
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which works through those who have no name for it, not even the name of God.' 1 7'
So "'if that word [God] has not much meaning for you,"' Tillich explained,
"'translate it, and speak of the depths ofyour life, of the source ofyour being, ofyour
ultimate concern, of what you take seriously without any reservation."' "
These trends in American religion have only accelerated since the 1960s. Thus,
the diversity of the American religious experience is ever more extraordinary, and
the diversity of thought within the traditional faiths is ever more pronounced.' 73 As
a result, Seeger's expansive definition of religion, if appropriate for the 1960s,
arguably is even more compelling today. 74 But however reflective of contemporary
understandings, the Seeger definition inevitably blurs the distinction between
religion and nonreligion. 175 Indeed, ff religion includes "the source ofyour being, of
your ultimate concern, of what you take seriously without any reservation," 76 then
religious liberty may be a problematic concept. More to the point, religious liberty
may be problematic to the extent that it treats religion specially under the law,
because a broad range of human thought and activity might very well qualify as
religious. Thus, the Free Exercise Clause might require special exemptions in
countless situations, and the Establishment Clause might preclude the government
from endorsing or favoring a variety of moral perspectives. Religious liberty could
quickly become unmanageable.
In light of these difficulties, it is not surprising that the Supreme Court has never
adopted the Seeger approach as a constitutional definition of religion.' 77 But at the
same time, the Court appears to agree that a definition like Seeger's might be well-
suited for the end of the twentieth century and that, if anything, America has
outgrown even the capacious approach of Seeger. Thus, as suggested earlier, the
Court today may regard religion as simply one form of autonomy, and religious
beliefs as simply one form of "internally derived" beliefs, to use the language of
171. Id. at 180 (quoting 2 PAUL TIuCi-, SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY 12 (1957)).
172. Id. at 187 (quoting PAUL TmILUC, THE SHAKING OF THE FOUNDATIONS 57 (1948))
(alteration in original) (emphasis omitted).
173. In his contribution to this Symposium, Professor Stephen J. Stein provides a rich
account of these developments, and he discusses the potential implications of contemporary
America's "astonishing religious diversity." StephenJ. SteinReligion/Religions in the United
States: Changing Perspectives and Prospects, 75 IND. L.J. 37, 59 (2000); see also id. at 47-
49.
174. Cf. id. at 58 ("Only a very fluid definition of religion can do justice to the multitude
of different 'religions' and forms of spirituality that exist in contemporary America.").
175. Cf Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) (extending Seeger definition to
include conscientious objector who had stricken word "religious" from his application and
who had declared that his beliefs were not religious in any conventional sense).
176. See supra text accompanying note 172.
177. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), for example, the Court ruled that the
religious practices of the Amish, which were Biblically based, traditional, and communal,
were entitled to constitutional protection under the Free Exercise Clause, but it stated that
such protection would not extend to practices that were merely "philosophical and personal,"
based on a "subjective evaluation and rejection of the contemporary secular values accepted
by the majority." Id. at 216; see also id. at 215-19. In his separate opinion, Justice Douglas
noted and protested the Court's apparent departure from the Seeger approach. See id. at 247-
49 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
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Seeger." At the very least, the Court appears to believe-perhaps with good
reason-that the line between religion and nonreligion is increasingly thin in
contemporary America. 179
Supporting the moderntendencyto blur religion and nonreligion is the increasing
politicization of religion- Religion always has played a role in American politics,18°
but in recent decades, the relationship between religious perspectives and political
ideologies has become unusually direct and highly visible. As Professor Robert
Wuthnow has demonstrated, the 1960s and 1970s witnessed a dramatic decline of
denominational differences in American religion and an equally dramatic rise of
divisions within the various denominations, divisions that increasingly placed
religious conservatives on one side and religious liberals on the other. 8' As the
competing groups confronted such issues as race relations, the war in Vietnam,
abortion, homosexuality, and the role of women in society, their religious differences
became increasingly political and increasingly polarizing, to the point that by the
1980s and 1990s it was possible to declare the existence of a "culture war" in
American society." And this culture war included explicitly political and partisan
behavior by the religious combatants, with the competing sides participating more
and more in electioneering, lobbying, and other forms of direct political action."
All of this suggests that religion not only influences politics in the contemporary
United States, but that religion is politics to a degree that may be unparalleled in the
American past. Religion is far more than politics, of course, even today, but the
reality and the perception that religious beliefs and political beliefs are closely
related tends to undermine the claim that religion warrants distinctive treatment
178. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 186; see also supra text accompanying notes 86-90; cf. Stein,
supra note 173, at 58 ("Religion has become whatever a person declares to be the object of
regard or pursuit.").
179. Focusing especially onthe issue of free exercise exemptions, Professors Christopher
L. Eisgruber and Lawrence G. Sager have argued that religious commitments cannot be
distinguished from other deep commitments, at least notin any way that would justify special
constitutional protection. See Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The
Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional BasisforProtecting Religious Conduct, 61
U. CE-. L. REv. 1245 (1994); cf. Underkuffler-Freund, Yoder and the Question of Equality,
supra note 92 (responding to Eisgruber and Sager by contending that special constitutional
protection for religion can indeed be justified, but only if religion is defined broadly enough
to includethe exercise of conscience). In his contribution to the current Symposium, Professor
Steven D. Smith suggests that Eisgruber and Sager beg the critical question that they purport
to resolve, that is, the question ofwhetherreligious commitments are relevantly different from
nonreligious commitments. See Smith, supra note 19, at 68-70.
180. And, in my view, properly so. See Conkle, supra note 18; Daniel 0. Conlde, Secular
Fundamentalism, Religious Fundamentalism, and the Search for Truth in Contemporary
America, 12 J.L. & REIuGION 337 (1995-96).
181. See ROBERT WUTHNOW, THE RESTRUCTuRiNG OFAMmCAN REIGION: SOCMTYAND
FA=TH SiNCE WORLD WARII (1988); see also Stein, supra note 173, at 57-58.
182. See JAMES DAvisoN HUNTER, CuLTURE WARs: Tim STRUGGLE TO DEFm AMmCA
(1991); cf. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (referring to a
contemporary American ' Kulturkampf').
183. See, e.g., ALLEN D. HERTZKE, REPRESENnNG GOD iN WASHNGTON: THE RoLE oF
REuGIous LOBBmS iN TE AMERICAN PoLITY (1988).
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under the Constitution. Political equality is a core political value, at least in the sense
of formal equality.18 To the extent that religious perspectives also are political
perspectives, therefore, it would seem that the religious perspectives should neither
be preferred nor disadvantaged as compared to their secular analogues. 1"
These various difficulties suggest that at the turn ofthe millenniunt the definition
of religion has become ever more elusive and problematic. As a result, the Supreme
Court has strong incentives to avoid the issue of definition whenever it can and, to
the extent that the issue cannot be avoided, to at least reduce its constitutional
significance. Formal neutrality serves both of these related objectives. The Court
cannot entirely escape the definitional problem-that is, as long as the Court finds
any content in the religion clauses. The Court need not set forth an explicit
constitutional definition of religion, but in order to apply its constitutional doctrine,
it must have some understanding, at least implicit, of what counts as "religion" and
what does not. Under the doctrinal approach offormal neutrality, however, the Court
need only determine whether "religion" has been subjected to deliberate or
purposeful discrimination. If there is no plausible argument that it has, the Court's
task is at an end. As compared to its doctrinal alternatives, formal neutrality limits
the occasions for a definitional inquiry. At the same time, it reduces the significance
of the question and thereby limits the adverse consequences of definitional
determinations that might be erroneous or doubtful. 86
C. Judicial Restraint and Federalism
During the last quarter century, judicial restraint has become an increasingly
important theme inthe Supreme Court's constitutional decisionmaking. This theme
includes three related components. First, as a general proposition, the Court today
is inclined to limit the scope of previously recognized constitutional rights and to
reject the creation of new ones, thereby expanding the authority of political
decisionmakers and reducing the Court's own function. In the bellwether context of
substantive due process, for example, the Court has restricted the reach of Roe v.
184. See supra Part III.A. In the context of freedom of speech, the concept of formal
equality generates an extremely strong constitutional presumption against viewpoint or
content-based regulation, especially when political or ideological messages may be
implicated. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
185. "Giving special protection to religion," argues Professor William P. Marshall, "gives
the views advanced by religion a false vitality in the political marketplace and skews political
debate." William P. Marshall, Religion as Ideas: Religion as Identity, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
IssuEs 385,401 (1996). And imposing special disabilities onreligion, ofcourse, likewise can
skew political debate, albeit in the opposite direction. Citing "the equality principle
underlying speech clause doctrine," Marshall rejects free exercise exemptions but supports
the inclusion of religion in general benefit programs. See id. at 404-05; see also Marshall,
supra note 7, at 207 (describing religion and nonreligion as "two alternative modes of
ideology").
186. See generally Marshall, supra note 7, at 194-217 (discussing juridical concerns
relating to the definition of religion and associated questions and arguing that these concerns
support the Court's general embrace of formal neutrality).
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Wade,187 overruling some of Roe's more contentious applications," and it has
rejected the claim that terminally ill patients have a constitutional right to physician-
assisted suicide." In this respect, judicial restraint calls for deference to the
majoritarian policies adopted by political officials.
A second component of judicial restraint is a preference for doctrinal rules as
opposed to more flexible standards, including standards that require the judiciary to
balance competing interests through a process of case-by-case decisionmaking. For
the current Court, this second component ofjudicial restraint is less prominent than
the first, but it is present to a significant extent. 9 ' Indeed, the potential for relatively
clear, formal constitutional rules may sometimes offset the Court's tendency to defer
to majoritarian decisionmaking. In the area of equal protection, for example, the
Court has not reduced-and arguably has invigorated-its enforcement of formal
equality, a constitutional principle that often is conducive to relatively clear-cut
exposition and application.'9'
Third, the Supreme Court today is deciding dramatically fewer cases than it did
in the recent past. Thus, the last fifteen years have witnessed a "radical downsizing
of the Supreme Court's docket,"'" with the Court granting plenary review and
providing written opinions in only about half as many cases as it did in the mid-
1980s. 93 Various factors may have contributed to this trend,'94 but the Supreme
Court's self-imposed "downsizing" appears to reflect a new-and more
humble-self-understanding of the Court's role in American society. More
187. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)
(replacing strict scrutiny, trimester framework of Roe with more relaxed "undue burden"
standard).
188. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 881-87 (upholding informed-consent and waiting-period
requirements for abortion and overruling prior holdings to the contrary in Akron v. Akron Ctr.
for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983), and in Thornburg v. American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986)).
189. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). Notably, the Court in Glucksberg
suggested that it no longer would recognize substantive due process rights that were not,
"objectively, 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."' Id. at 712 (quoting Moore
v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion)); see also id. at 712
(stating that nothing more than rational basis review is appropriate unless the case implicates
a "fundamental right" that is "deeply rooted in our legal tradition"). Had this restrictive
standard been in place in 1973, the Court could not have decided Roe the way it did. See
Daniel 0. Conkle, The Second Death of Substantive Due Process, 62 IND. L.J. 215, 227-28
(1987).
190. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Foreword: The Justices
ofRules and Standards, 106 HARv. L. REV. 22 (1992). See generally CAss R. SuNsTEIN, ONE
CASEATATMfE: JUDICIALMINMuAiSM ONTHE SUPREME CouRT at xiii (1999) (arguing that
some Justices think it is important to adopt "clear, bright-line rules," but that the Court as a
whole tends to favor more narrow, "minimalist" decisionmaking).
191. See supra Part IH.A.
192. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Shrinking Docket, TRIAL, May 1996, at 71, 71-72.
193. See David M. O'Brien, Join-3 Votes, the Rule of Four, the Cert. Pool, and the
Supreme Court's Shrinking Plenary Docket, 13 J.L. & POL. 779, 779 (1997).
194. For sophisticated discussions, see, for example, Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken
Docket of the Rehnquist Court, 1996 SuP. CT. REv. 403; O'Brien, supra note 193.
2000]
INDIANA LA WJOURNAL
specifically, the Court's shrinking docket maybe linked to the othertwo components
ofjudicial restraint. Justices who honor the first component, the policy of judicial
deference, naturally will be less inclined to review majoritarian actions, at least if
those majoritarian actions have been upheld by the lower courts.'95 And the second
component-a preference for rules, as opposed to standards-likewise supports the
Supreme Court's downsizing, because rules can guide political decisionmakers and
the lower courts without the need for continual, case-by-case oversight from the
Court itself.'96
In the context of the religion clauses, formal neutrality honors judicial restraint by
limiting the Court's role not only on definitional questions, as noted above, ' but
also more generally. To be sure, formal neutrality can lead to the invalidation of
governmental policies that might survive under other approaches.' 8 More often,
however, it calls for the approval of policies that might be invalid under competing
approaches such as substantive neutrality or separationism.' Accordingly, formal
neutrality honors the policy of judicial deference even as it emphasizes a rule of
decision that is straightforward and relatively easy to apply-a rule that might limit
the need for case-by-case review by the Supreme Court. Accordingly, formal
neutrality supports judicial restraint in each of the three senses I have discussed: it
tends to encourage deference to political decisionmakers; it offers a clearly defined,
rule-based approach to questions of religious liberty; and, for these very reasons, it
also supports the downsizing of the Supreme Court's docket.
Alongside the general theme ofjudicial restraint, there is a counter theme in the
Supreme Court's recent constitutional decisionmaking. Thus, in the lastdecade, even
as it has emphasized judicial restraint in the field of individual rights, the Court has
become more activist in protecting the constitutional interests of the states. Thus, the
Court has given new meaning to federalistic restraints on national power,
invalidating congressional legislation on this basis to an extent not witnessed since
the 1930s.2"' The Court's embrace of constitutional federalism, however, does not
195. See David G. Savage, DocketReflects Ideological Shifts, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1995, at 40.
196. See Hellman, supra note 194, at 430-31.
197. See supra Part III.B.
198. See, e.g., Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (invalidating Texas sales
tax exemption that was granted to religious literature, but not other literature); Rosenberger
v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (ruling that University of
Virginia could not exclude religious publications from program of funding for student
publications and activities).
199. See supra Part Il.B.
Focusing on the Free Exercise Clause, Professor Eugene Volokh has argued that the
Supreme Court's shift toward formal neutrality is consistent with the Court's repudiation of
economic substantive due process, with each development reflecting a reluctance to second-
guess majoritarian decisions on questions not readily subject to judicial resolution. See
Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Modelfor Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L. REv. 1465,
1521-29 (1999).
200. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (10th Amendment); United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (Commerce Clause); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44 (1996) (11 th Amendment); Idaho v. Coeur D'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997) (11 th
Amendment); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (14th Amendment, Section 5);
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (10th Amendment); Florida Prepaid
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undermine, and it in fact supports, the doctrine of formal neutrality under the
religion clauses.
In deciding the constitutional claims of individual citizens, the Supreme Court
defines the meaning ofconstitutionally protected individual rights. At the same time,
however, it defines the boundary between national and state power, for to decide that
the national Constitution protects an individual right is to remove the issue from
state control.21' Conversely, to reject a claim of individual right is to leave the states
free to resolve the issue as they please. As a result, the Supreme Court's activist
protection of states' rights is not entirely at odds with the Court's judicial restraint
in the context of individual rights-at least to the extent that judicial restraint is
understood in the sense of its first component, judicial deference to majoritarian
decisionmaking. In protecting states' rights, the Supreme Court invalidates
majoritarian decisionmaking by Congress, but it does so in order to facilitate
majoritarian decisionmaking by the states. As a result, this form ofjudicial activism,
like the Court's judicial restraint in the field of individual rights, supports the
formulation of constitutional doctrine that defers to whatever policies a particular
state might choose.
Formal neutrality can be used to restrict the states' authority, but, in general, it
operates to give the states more leeway than does its doctrinal alternatives.2" The
Supreme Court's new emphasis on federalism, like its emphasis on judicial restraint
in the field of individual rights, therefore tends to support the doctrine of formal
neutrality under the religion clauses.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have traced the American understanding of religious liberty from
its theological and Christian origins to its contemporary emphasis on formal
neutrality-that is, equal and nondiscriminatory treatment not only between and
among religions, but also between religion and nonreligion. I also have suggested
that various forces-the general appeal of formal equality, the ever-more-difficult
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999) (lth
Amendment and 14th Amendment, Section 5); College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999) (11th Amendment and 14th
Amendment, Section 5); Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999) (state sovereign immunity
from federal claims asserted in state court). The Supreme Court's renewed concern for
constitutional federalism has given rise to a wealth of scholarly commentary. For recent
sympdsia containing collections of important articles, along with citations and references to
other relevant literature, see Symposium, New Frontiers ofFederalism, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REv.
923 (1997); Symposium, National Power and State Autonomy: Calibrating the New "New
Federalism ", 32 IND. L. REV. 1 (1998).
201. This is true as long as the Constitution is construed to protect the individual right from
state infringement. And most ofthe important individual-rights provisions of the Constitution
have in fact been extended to the states, primarily through Supreme Court decisions holding
that the Fourteenth Amendment limits the states not only by its own terms, but also by
"incorporating" almost all of the Bill of Rights. See generally Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145, 147-50 (1968) (elaborating the Court's incorporation doctrine).
202. See supra Part II.B.
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problem of defining religion, and the increasing importance ofjudicial restraint and
federalism-support a continuing and perhaps expanding reliance on formal
neutrality in the years ahead.
Formal neutrality has great appeal. But it also carries substantial risks for religious
liberty. Under the Free Exercise Clause, the impact of formal neutrality is clearly
detrimental, because it limits the protection of religiously motivated conduct. 3
Under the Establishment Clause, formal neutrality is benign in many contexts, but
there are dangers here as well: the distinctiveness of religion is further put in
question, and the vibrant independence of religious institutions may be threatened.
Although I believe that formal neutrality is likely to prevail in the future, this
result is not inevitable. Formal neutrality is an increasingly dominant concept, but
it remains a contested concept, under the Free Exercise and the Establishment
Clauses alike. And the existence of competing understandings of religious liberty,
understandings that require special-not equal-treatment for religion, may suggest
that we have not entirely abandoned the original theology of the religion clauses.
More specifically, these competing understandings may suggest that the American
legal culture remains open to the argument that religion is, as the Founders believed,
both distinct and distinctly important.
Needless to say, reversing the trend toward formal neutrality will not be easy. It
will require a persuasive case that religion really is distinct and distinctly
important."4 Otherwise, religious liberty should indeed be subsumed within more
general understandings of equality and autonomy,"5 and it should not be immune
from more general trends favoring judicial restraint and states' rights.
The idea that religion is distinct and distinctly important was obvious to Jesus
when he answered the Pharisees. It was obvious to the Founders when they embraced
the original theology of American religious liberty. It is obvious no longer. Whether
it can be demonstrated afresh is a central question for the third millennium.
203. This statement is not entirely uncontroiersial. In particular, some would argue that
formal neutrality in the free exercise context in fact is preferable from a religious point of
view, at least as opposed to a scheme of judicially crafted religious exemptions. Such a
scheme, according to these observers, can paint religion as a weak force, can undermine the
truth claims of religion, and can leave believers in the position of religious supplicants to a
secularjudiciary. See Marci A. Hamilton, The ConstitutionalRhetoric ofReligion, 20 U. ARK.
LrTrLn ROCK L.J. 619 (1998); Robin W. Lovin, Religious Freedom, 1997, 114 CHRISTI4N
CENTuRY 716, 717 (1997); Tushnet, supra note 35, at 136, 138.
204. As Professor Scott C. Idleman has suggested, what is needed is "action that teaches
society about the value and meaning of religious faith and exercise and thereby attempts to
transform the culture," including especially the legal culture. Idleman, supra note 83, at 264-
65 (emphasis in original).
205. Cf. Steven D. Smith, Is a Coherent Theory of Religious Freedom Possible?, 15
CONST. COMiMNTARY 73, 81 (1998) (suggesting that if religious liberty is merely an
inherited commitment, it might well be dissolved into other, more current constitutional
values).
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